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The (not-so) “Brave New World of 
International Criminal Enforcement”1: 
THE INTRICACIES OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL 
WHITE-COLLAR INVESTIGATIONS 
“We are dealing with a new era of crime on a global scale”2 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States is routinely involved in cross-border 
criminal investigations. The Department of Justice (DOJ) 
supports the enforcement of federal criminal laws domestically, 
and where authorized and appropriate, abroad.3 Notably, within 
the DOJ’s Criminal Division, the Fraud Section has proven 
instrumental in combatting economic crime around the world.4 
It has the capabilities of “managing complex and multi-district 
litigation” and has the “ability to [position] resources . . . to 
address law enforcement priorities and respond to 
geographically shifting crim[inal]” investigations.5 In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, however, the DOJ has 
come under the scrutiny of commentators and practitioners in 
the financial and legal fields for the apparent decline in federal 
white-collar prosecutions.6 In fact, there has been an ongoing 
decline in both these prosecutions and their convictions, 
reaching a twenty-year historic low in 2015.7 This raises the 
question: how can there be a decline when prominent financial 
firms and their top executives were at the forefront of the 
 
 1 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 2 Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks 
at the 26th Annual Association of Certified Fraud Examiners Global Fraud Conference 
(June 15, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-
caldwell-delivers-remarks-26th-annual-association [https://perma.cc/PC37-E7P9]. 
 3 See U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD SECTION (FRD), https://www.justice.gov/
criminal-fraud [https://perma.cc/WY42-KDEB]. 
 4 See id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See James Kwak, America’s Top Prosecutors Used to Go After Top Executives. What 
Changed?, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/books/review/the-
chickenshit-club-jesse-eisinger-.html [https://perma.cc/BXZ9-SYWZ]. 
 7 White Collar Crime Convictions Continue to Decline, TRACREPORTS (Apr. 7, 
2016), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/421/ [https://perma.cc/D29N-SYZX]. 
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financial crisis which “devastated the global economy and cost 
the United States almost nine million jobs?”8 
Commentators have explained that the DOJ’s failure to 
prosecute corporations and their employees stems from the ever-
growing social hierarchy within the DOJ itself.9 The cultural 
shift at the DOJ since the early 2000s has brought in the top 
prosecutors from the most powerful law firms in the country.10 
Increasingly, DOJ prosecutors and defense attorneys come from 
the same collection of sophisticated and well-educated litigators, 
though at different stages in their careers.11 The mindset, 
therefore, is that conducting a criminal investigation against 
heads of multimillion dollar global corporations is not only risky 
but “social[ly] uncomfortable” and career compromising.12 Even 
with a seemingly flawless case, “going to trial is always 
[considered] a gamble.”13 Not only are there career ramifications 
of having “a ding on [a prosecutor’s] record,” but “[l]os[ing] a 
white-collar criminal trial” is seen as “prosecutorial overreach.”14 
James Comey, a former United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York (SDNY), used the term the “Chickenshit 
Club”15 to describe the members of the DOJ’s social structure. 
This club, he explained, is comprised of prosecutors who have 
never had an acquittal or hung jury because they do not want to 
jeopardize their pristine record, future career opportunities, and 
the “symbiotic relationship . . . between Big Law and the 
Department of Justice.”16 
Similar to the social aspects driving the DOJ’s 
prosecutorial approach, professionals in the legal field have 
called into question its use of deferred prosecution agreements 
 
 8 Kwak, supra note 6 (emphasis added); Justice Department Data Reveal 29 
Percent Drop in Criminal Prosecutions of Corporations, TRACREPORTS (Apr. 7, 2016), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/ [https://perma.cc/X4Z3-LRU7] (corporate 
prosecutions filed from 2004 to 2014 has decreased by over twenty-nine percent). 
 9 JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES xi-xxi (2017). 
 10 See generally id. 
 11 See id. at 177–78. 
 12 Kwak, supra note 6. 
 13 Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail, NEW YORKER (July 
31, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/31/why-corrupt-bankers-avoid-
jail [https://perma.cc/JVX2-WD2C]. 
 14 Id. 
 15 EISINGER, supra note 9 at xii; see also CNN Library, James Comey Fast 
Facts, CNN (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/03/us/james-comey-fast-
facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/JQE8-GKKY]. 
 16 Kwak, supra note 6; EISINGER, supra note 9, at 192; see also EISINGER, supra 
note 9 at 194 (“It became no longer clear whether the Department of Justice pushed 
investigations that turned out to be lucrative for the white-shoe big law firms or whether 
big law firms nudged prosecutors into conducting the types of investigation that required 
lucrative internal probes.”). 
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(DPA) and non-prosecution agreements (NPA)—a relatively 
new, “civilized” technique for charging corporations.17 These 
agreements, the first of which was formed by Mary Jo White of 
the U.S. Attorney’s office for the SDNY in 1994,18 require 
admissions of corporate wrongdoing as a whole but “avoid the 
ignominy of criminal [white-collar] convictions,” so long as a 
corporation fulfills its commitments under the agreement.19 The 
DOJ’s Criminal Division has entered into these agreements “in 
more than two-thirds of the corporate cases it resolved between 
2010 and 2012.”20 Judge Jed Rakoff, a senior United States 
District Judge of the SDNY, at a New York City Bar Association 
presentation declared that not indicting individuals, but instead 
using DPAs to settle corporate cases, was “technically and 
morally suspect.”21 In 2013, he further noted that the “DOJ ha[d] 
‘not prosecuted any top Wall Street executive in relation to the 
financial crisis but [instead,] struck deals with companies using 
deferred prosecution agreement[s] over sanction violations and 
money laundering without charging any individuals.’”22 What 
incentives, then, do corporations have to not engage in 
fraudulent transactions, or hold their employees accountable for 
engaging in financially motivated crimes, if the DOJ is 
essentially giving out a free pass?23 
 
 17 Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, The ‘Civil-izing’ of White-Collar 
Criminal Enforcement, N.Y. L.J. (May 27, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202598915323/The-Civilizing-of-WhiteCollar-
Criminal-Enforcement [https://perma.cc/LG95-MV7Q]. 
 18 See EISINGER, supra note 9, at 93. 
 19 David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate 
Criminal Prosecution, 49 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2016) (“In a deferred 
prosecution agreement, criminal charges are filed but eventually dismissed if the 
corporation complies with the terms of the agreement; in a non-prosecution agreement, 
criminal charges are never even filed if the company meets its obligations under the 
agreement.”) Id. at 1237 n.1; see also Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 17. 
 20 Uhlmann supra note 19 at 1237; see also EISINGER, supra note 9, at 197 
(“Through the 2000s—with the Enron reversals, the Arthur Andersen backlash, the 
Thompson memo rollback, the KPMG case, the Bear Stearns trial losses—prosecutors 
began to focus less on investigations of individual executives. All the changes moved in 
one direction: to help big corporations and their top officials.”). 
 21 Thomas Fox, Are Deferred Prosecution Agreements Morally Suspect?, 
LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM CORP. (Nov. 20, 2013, 12:36 PM) 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/corporate/b/fcpa-compliance/archive/2013/
11/20/are-deferred-prosecution-agreements-morally-suspect.aspx?Redirected=true 
[https://perma.cc/Z5MK-YPE4]; see also Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, U.S. DISTRICT CT. SOUTHERN 
DISTRICT OF N.Y., http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Rakoff [https://perma.cc/78YQ-
EQDZ]. Judge Rakoff delivered the district court opinion in United States v. Allen, 160 
F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) rev’d, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 22 Fox, supra note 21. 
 23 As early as the 1980s, the practical effects of white-collar prosecutions, or 
lack thereof, on corporate actors have played an important role in policy debates. John 
Keeney, the former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ’s Criminal Division 
responded to a bill to amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1986 as follows: 
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While the DOJ’s cultural landscape and its monetary 
compliance agreements arguably offer troubling insight into the 
Department’s growing leniency towards prosecuting financial 
corporations and their employees, a more fundamental concern 
has come into focus from a recent United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit decision, United States v. Allen.24 On July 
19, 2017, the court reversed the DOJ’s first successful 
prosecution of two individuals in connection with the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) manipulation scandal of 2012.25 
In Allen, the court unanimously overturned a fraud conviction of 
two defendants, finding that the prosecution was tainted by the 
DOJ’s reliance on a witness who had been exposed to the 
defendants’ compelled testimony before a parallel government 
agency in the United Kingdom.26 The court held that the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the use and derivative use of compelled 
testimony in criminal proceedings in American courtrooms even 
if that testimony was legally obtained abroad.27 Despite 
recognizing a growing interdependency on foreign agencies to 
aid in global financial investigations, the appeals court used the 
heavy Kastigar burden28 to find the evidence presented at trial 
was tainted and to reverse the indictments.29 Not only did the 
Second Circuit interpret the guiding legal precedent to extend to 
foreign-obtained evidence, it also confirmed that the burden of 
establishing an airtight fraud investigation from its inception 
fell on the DOJ30—offering little to no guidance on how to 
accomplish this feat. 
 
If the risk of conduct in violation of the statute becomes merely monetary, the 
fine will simply become a cost of doing business, payable only upon being 
caught and in many instances, it will be only a fraction of the profit acquired 
from the corrupt activity. Absent the threat of incarceration, there may no 
longer be any compelling need to resist the urge to acquire business in any way 
possible. 
Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C DAVIS L. REV. 497, 
529–30 n.97 (2015) (quoting Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, 
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. And Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. 
on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 149 (1986) 
(response to written questions of Senator D’Amato from John C. Keeney)). 
 24 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 101 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 25 See id.; see also Sean Hecker & Karolos Seeger, The Use of Foreign Compelled 
Testimony in Cross-Border Investigations—The Impact of the Second Circuit’s Allen 
Decision, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: BUSINESS CRIME 2018, 
9–12 (2018), http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/pdf/bc18_chapter%203%20%20
debevoise%20and%20plimpton.pdf [https://perma.cc/58F9-UFFX]. 
 26 Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25, at 9. 
 27 Allen, 864 F.3d at 101; Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25, at 9. 
 28 See infra Section I.A. 
 29 Allen, 864 F.3d at 87–88, 97; Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25. 
 30 See Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25, at 13. 
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Although this note does not seek to argue that the DOJ 
should forgo upholding the values of the Constitution, notably 
the Self-Incrimination Clause under the Fifth Amendment, or 
that the Second Circuit erred in overturning the indictments in 
the Allen case, it does question an almost out-of-date approach 
to conducting international white-collar criminal investigations. 
Such a restriction to use testimony, either directly or indirectly, 
compelled lawfully in foreign jurisdictions creates an enormous 
hurdle for the DOJ to overcome.31 The impact of the Allen case 
deters and provides little incentive for the DOJ to pursue 
international crime on a global scale, especially related to 
market manipulation, which was a factor in the financial crisis.32 
In an age of global markets and cross-border financial crime, the 
DOJ’s failure to prosecute these crimes can be attributed to the 
challenges and complexity faced by prosecutors in investigating 
and prosecuting multinational corporations, which could very 
well be amplified by the Allen decision. This note argues that the 
ever-expanding, multi-jurisdictional aspect of prosecutions has 
created a need to establish a new overarching agreement, such as 
a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and taint team hybrid, between 
the United States and foreign jurisdictions who currently use 
legally obtained compelled testimony—an international approach 
to combat an international problem. 
Part I of this note explores the background of the use and 
derivative use immunity statute and the Supreme Court’s 
Kastigar standard that influenced the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Allen, highlighting the decision’s potential impact. Part II 
analyzes the breadth of international white-collar crimes and 
calls into question the Second Circuit’s “solutions” for the DOJ 
moving forward. Part III proposes an international legal solution 
for prosecuting global financial crimes by implementing bilateral 
treaties between the DOJ and its foreign counterparts. This 
would essentially shift the overwhelming burden of obtaining 
taint-free testimony to all prosecutorial agencies involved, 
eliminating the constitutional question altogether. 
I. THE ALLEN DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
A. Derivative Use Immunity and the Kastigar Standard 
The Allen decision has significant implications if 
subsequent cases rely on its holding, and understanding the 
 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
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guiding legal precedent behind the decision provides insight on 
the constitutional concerns arising out of foreign-obtained 
evidence. In 1972, the Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United 
States adopted the use immunity statute as the constitutional 
standard for gathering testimony.33 Specifically, it “upheld the 
constitutionality of compelling testimony in exchange for the 
‘use and derivative use’ immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002.”34 It 
reasoned that “the scope of the protection [the immunity statute] 
afforded was ‘coextensive with the scope of the [Fifth 
Amendment35] privilege.’”36 The Court stressed that the “use and 
derivative use” that is implicit in the language of the immunity 
statute protects defendants and witnesses from the direct “use” 
of protected statements in trial and the “derivative use” of any 
immunized testimony and evidence gained as a result of those 
protected statements.37 Therefore, the statute prohibits the use 
of “compelled testimony in any respect” to ensure that the 
testimony does not implicate the witness or violate the immunity 
provided under the Amendment.38 The Court reaffirmed that the 
burden of proof was on the United States government to prove 
that its evidence used at trial is not based on immunized 
testimony or the fruits of such testimony.39 This, however, 
cannot be established by a mere “negation of taint[ed]” 
evidence.40 Rather, the prosecution has “the affirmative duty to 
 
 33 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460–62 (1972). 
 34 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 91 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Kastigar, 406 
U.S. at 453). 
 35 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in 
pertinent part provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself.” Id. 
 36 Allen, 864 F.3d at 91 (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453). 
 37 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443, 459–60. 
The use immunity statute (18 U.S.C. § 6002) allows the government to 
prosecute the witness using evidence obtained independently of the witness’s 
immunized testimony. Section 6002 provides: “[N]o testimony or other 
information compelled under the order (or any information directly or 
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used 
against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, 
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.” 
OFF. OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRM 500-999, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 
718. DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY, https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-
718-derivative-use-immunity [https://perma.cc/A78A-K68F] [hereinafter CRIMINAL 
RESOURCE MANUAL]. 
 38 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original); see also CRIMINAL 
RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 37. 
 39 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460; see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. 
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964). 
 40 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460. 
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prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a 
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.”41 
This holding has led courts in subsequent white-collar 
cases, including multinational financial cases like Allen, to 
require a “Kastigar hearing” in which the prosecution must 
prove that its case is solely attributable to taint-free evidence.42 
A Kastigar hearing, conducted following initial briefings and 
oral arguments regarding a defendant’s Kastigar motion,43 is 
used to “definitively resolve” the issues of whether the 
prosecution has met its burden.44 This hearing is similar but not 
synonymous to an evidentiary hearing.45 Its scope is limited to 
assessing the “illicit ‘use’ of compelled testimony” in the 
American courtroom.46 More formulaically, the court overhearing 
the case must analyze whether the prosecution has violated a 
defendant’s or witnesses’ Fifth Amendment rights if one of the 
following is met: (1) the “immunized testimony has some 
evidentiary effect in a prosecution against the witness”; (2) “there 
is a recognizable danger of official manipulation that may subject 
the immunized witness to a criminal prosecution arising out of 
the investigation in which the testimony is given”; or (3) a 
“cooperating witness’s exposure to compelled testimony motivates 
that witness to cooperate and testify against the defendants.”47 
B. The Second Circuit’s Decision in Allen 
The Allen case arose out of a United Kingdom 
investigation of two employees, Anthony Allen and Anthony  
 41 Id.; see also CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 37. 
 42 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461–62. The Second Circuit interpreted the 
Kastigar burden of proof as a preponderance of the evidence standard four years after 
the Kastigar decision, emphasizing that 
[w]hile this formulation repeats rather than defines the word “derived,” it 
places a significant gloss upon it by putting the burden firmly on the 
prosecution to demonstrate that an indictment [and/or conviction] is the 
product of legitimate rather than tainted evidence, and by insisting that 
legitimate evidence be from a source “wholly independent of the compelled 
testimony.” 
United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1976) (emphasis added); see also 
United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 92 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 43 United States v. Volpe, 42 F. Supp. 2d 204, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (“While the 
court has discretion to hold the [Kastigar] hearing before, during, or after the trial, it is 
the general practice in this circuit to defer such a hearing until after trial.”) (citations 
omitted); see also United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y, 2016) rev’d, 864 
F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 44 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 687. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 690. 
 47 Id. at 691 (citing United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 82 (2d Cir.1991)); 
see also United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 689–90 (2d Cir.1990). 
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Conti, at Rabobank, a Netherlands-based bank, for their roles as 
the bank’s U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitters in the suspected 
manipulation of the rate.48 In 2013, the United Kingdom’s 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), an equivalent agency to the 
DOJ, carried out compulsory interviews,49 pursuant to its 
statutory authority, where both Allen and Conti were compelled 
to testify, potentially under penalty of imprisonment.50 Adhering 
to U.K. law, the FCA granted the defendants direct use 
immunity but not derivative use immunity, a distinction allowed 
abroad but not domestically.51 The FCA also conducted an 
interview with Rabobank’s Japanese Yen LIBOR submitter, 
Paul Robson, for his suspected involvement in the manipulation 
 
 48 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2017). Manipulating 
benchmark interest rates, notably LIBOR, has grave consequences. “LIBOR [itself] is a 
benchmark interest rate based on the rates at which banks lend unsecured funds to each 
other on the London interbank market.” James McBride, Understanding the Libor 
Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/
understanding-libor-scandal [https://perma.cc/NKB6-USAH]. Worldwide, financial 
institutions use LIBOR as a base rate for setting interest rates on “hundreds of trillions 
of dollars in securities and [consumer and corporate] loans . . . . including government 
and corporate debt, as well as auto, student, and home loans, including over half of the 
United States’ flexible rate mortgages.” Id.; see also Allen, 864 F.3d at 69. 
 49 Interviews under compulsion may be conducted by the FCA under sections 171 to 
173 of Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000. The relevant sections of the Act are as follows: 
171. Powers of persons appointed under section 167. 
(1) An investigator may require the person who is the subject of the 
investigation (“the person under investigation”) or any person connected with 
the person under investigation— 
(a) to attend before the investigator at a specified time and place and 
answer questions; or 
(b) otherwise to provide such information as the investigator may require. 
(2) An investigator may also require any person to produce at a specified time 
and place any specified documents or documents of a specified description. 
(3) A requirement under subsection (1) or (2) may be imposed only so far as the 
investigator concerned reasonably considers the question, provision of 
information or production of the document to be relevant to the purposes of the 
investigation. 
Financial Services and Market Act 2000, c.8 § 171 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2000/8/section/171 [https://perma.cc/8499-E9WT]. 
 50 United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), rev’d, 864 
F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 51 See Section I.A (discussing United States’ treatment of “use and derivative 
use” immunity); see also Clients & Friends Memorandum from Cadwalader, Wickersham 
& Taft, LLP, US Second Circuit Finds Testimony Compelled by UK Regulators to be 
Inadmissible in Criminal Proceedings (July 26, 2017), https://www.cadwalader.com/
resources/clients-friends-memos/us-second-circuit-finds-testimony-compelled-by-uk-
regulators-to-be-inadmissible-in-criminal-proceedings [https://perma.cc/ZU5K-XZZ8] 
(describing the common law and statutory protection granted to defendants and 
witnesses under U.K. law). 
2018] (NOT SO) BRAVE NEW WORLD 307 
scheme.52 Later that same year, the FCA pursued a regulatory 
enforcement action against Robson and disclosed to him relevant 
testimonial evidence which included Allen and Conti’s compelled 
statements.53 Shortly after, however, the FCA stayed its action 
against Robson and gave all of its evidence overseas to the DOJ 
which had already begun pursuing its own criminal 
investigation.54 In 2014, the DOJ charged Robson with bank fraud 
to which he plead guilty.55 As part of Robson’s plea package, he 
agreed to be a witness in the mounting case by both the U.K. and 
U.S. enforcement agencies against Allen and Conti.56 
Aware of potential Fifth Amendment and tainted 
evidence issues, the DOJ advised Robson that he was not to 
provide any of the information he gleaned from Allen’s and 
Conti’s transcripts with U. S. prosecutors, since his testimony 
before the grand jury was to be solely based on his personal 
knowledge.57 The DOJ coordinated with the FCA and held 
meetings to address the need to establish a wall between the two 
agencies.58 It even used a “separate filter team” of attorneys from 
a different section of the DOJ to address issues related to the 
FCA’s compulsory interviews.59 Following Robson’s testimony 
before the United States court, both Allen and Conti were 
charged with bank and wire fraud.60 Allen and Conti’s 
indictments rested solely on “certain material information 
[Robson] supplied to the grand jury.”61 
On appeal, Allen and Conti argued that the DOJ had 
violated their Fifth Amendment rights through the derivative 
use of their compelled testimony heard during trial when Robson 
was called upon to testify.62 Arguing the standards for testimony 
gathering addressed in Kastigar,63 they contended that the 
District Court erred in assessing whether Robson’s testimony 
was tainted by his exposure to Allen and Conti’s FCA-compelled 
testimony, that the DOJ did not meet its burden of showing that 
all testimony used during trial was untainted, and that the 
 
 52 Allen, 864 F.3d at 68, 72, 76. 
 53 Id. at 76–77. 
 54 Id. at 77. 
 55 Id. at 68, 77. 
 56 Id. at 68. 
 57 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 694–95. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on 
Kastigar at 2 n.1, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-
00272-JSR), ECF No. 95. 
 60 Allen, 864 F.3d at 68. 
 61 Id.; see also Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25, at 9. 
 62 Allen, 864 F.3d at 68, 79. 
 63 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460–62 (1972). 
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DOJ’s use of Robson’s testimony was “not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”64 The defendants filed a motion for a post-trial 
Kastigar hearing or to suppress Robson’s testimony.65 The motion 
argued that because Robson’s review of the FCA transcripts 
violated the defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights and ultimately 
tainted Robson’s testimony in the United States proceedings, the 
indictments against Allen and Conti should be overturned.66 
The Second Circuit confirmed that applying a Kastigar 
analysis to the evidence of the case exposed the DOJ’s 
manipulation of foreign-compelled testimony and denied the 
defendants a fair trial domestically.67 It concluded that “the Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition on the [derivative] use of [a defendant’s] 
compelled testimony in American criminal proceedings applies 
even when a foreign sovereign has compelled [that] testimony.”68 
Under American constitutional law, it reasoned that because the 
Kastigar decision correctly safeguarded a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial, compelled testimony must be granted use and derivative use 
immunity—any amount or form of taint is prohibited.69 While the 
Second Circuit did not go so far as the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v. North70 to 
require the DOJ to demonstrate that a witness’s exposure to 
compelled testimony “did not in any manner subtly ‘refresh his 
memory, focus or organize his thoughts,’ or in some other traceless 
way influence his state of mind,” it did hold that the DOJ is 
required to prove that a defendant’s exposure “did not shape, alter, 
or affect the information that he provided and that the Government 
used.”71 This burden, while not as overwhelming as the one 
announced in North, creates a towering obstacle for the DOJ to 
confront in an already complex investigation.72 
Despite the Second Circuit’s firm decision to expand the 
use of the Kastigar standard to evaluate foreign-compelled 
 
 64 Allen, 864 F.3d at 79 (emphasis in original); see also Hecker & Seeger, supra 
note 25 at 10. 
 65 Allen, 864 F.3d 63 at 78. 
 66 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 691–92. 
 67 Allen, 864 F.3d at 97. 
 68 Id. at 68; see also Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25 at 10. 
 69 Allen, 864 F.3d at-68; see also CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL supra note 37. 
 70 See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 71 Allen, 864 F.3d at 93 (internal quotations omitted); see also Marc P. Berger 
& Yana Grishkan, Second Circuit Rules Fifth Amendment Applicable to Statements 
Provided to Foreign Governments, BLOOMBERG L. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (July 31, 2017), 
http://www.ropeswealthadvisors.com/~/media/Files/articles/2017/July/spRabobank%20
73117%20SRLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XHU-QSEF]. 
 72 See Peter J. Henning, Libor And London Whale Cases Show Hurdles with 
Foreign Defendants, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/24/business/dealbook/fraud-prosecution-libor-london-whale-cases.html?mcubz=1 
[https://perma.cc/RHY9-VV3V]. 
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testimony, it did address the DOJ’s concern that prohibition of 
foreign-compelled testimony on its use in United States courts 
could “hamper the prosecution of criminal conduct that crosses 
international borders.”73 It explicitly recognized that cross-border 
criminal investigations have become more prevalent in recent 
years and that foreign agencies are increasingly reaching out to 
the DOJ for cooperation and aid with fraud investigations.74 The 
court noted, however, that the DOJ has recently taken steps to 
circumvent Kastigar issues by embedding DOJ prosecutors into 
foreign law enforcement departments, equivalent to “taint 
teams.”75 It commended the agency on taking this major step that 
goes beyond mere cross-border collaboration since there is 
currently “an increased emphasis in the United States on 
individual culpability as a component to, or even in place of, 
corporate resolutions.”76 The court concluded that while it “do[es] 
 
 73 Allen, 864 F.3d at 87–90 (quoting Brief for the United States at 123, U.S. v. 
Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (Nos. 16-898 (L), 16-939 (CON)). 
 74 Allen 864 F.3d at 89; see also Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71. 
Acting Assistant Attorney General Blanco explained that, from the DOJ’s 
perspective, “we increasingly find ourselves looking across the globe to collect 
evidence and identify witnesses necessary to build cases, requiring greater and 
closer collaboration with our foreign counterparts.” In Allen, the Second Circuit 
recognized the same trend, noting that cross border prosecutions have become 
more common and that “[t]he rise in non-prosecution agreements and deferred 
prosecution agreements between the U.S. and foreign entities for misconduct 
occurring abroad attests to this new reality.” 
Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25, at 11 (quoting Kenneth A. Blanco, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Speaks at the Atlantic Council Inter-
American Dialogue Event on lessons from Brazil: Crisis, Corruption and Global 
Cooperation, Washington, D.C. (July 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-
assistant-attorney-general-kenneth-blanco-speaks-atlantic-council-inter-american-1 [https://
perma.cc/PMK5-CM6L] (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 75 See Latham & Watkins, Latham & Watkins Client Alert Commentary Number 
2153: DOJ Announces Secondment to UK’s Corruption Prosecutor (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/DOJ-announces-secondment-UK-corruption-
prosecutor [https://perma.cc/4F3Q-LX4U]. 
On May 24, 2017, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Trevor 
N. McFadden announced that the DOJ will send an anti-corruption prosecutor 
to work with the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO).
 
The two-year secondment will mark the first time 
that the DOJ’s Criminal Division has sent a prosecutor to work full-time with 
foreign agencies on regulatory and financial crime matters. . . . In his speech, 
McFadden highlighted the recent growth in foreign partners’ requests for legal 
assistance.
 
He noted a 147% increase in the number of foreign requests for US-
based evidence for foreign bribery and corruption investigations and a 75% 
increase in the number of requests from the US government to foreign 
counterparts since 2012. The DOJ has expanded its Office of International 
Affairs and has set up additional units in response to this growth. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71; Allen, 864 F.3d at 89 
(discussing embedding prosecutors with foreign law enforcement agencies). 
 76 Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71. 
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not presume to know exactly what this brave new world of 
international criminal enforcement will entail,” it is, however, 
confident that trials conducted within the United States would 
continue to remain fair and constitutionally sound.77 
Without a detailed solution to overcome the risk of 
compelled testimony and its Fifth Amendment implications 
infiltrating foreign-collected evidence, the court suggested that the 
DOJ, in addition to taint teams, “will need to be in [even] closer 
coordination with its foreign counterparts” and to advise parallel 
agencies that the United States will need to be part of white-collar 
investigations “at even earlier stages” than initially considered.78 
Once collaboration is established at the “onset” of an investigation, 
the DOJ will then have to be “even more vigilant in gathering 
evidence” to ensure that the witnesses with whom the prosecutors 
wish to confer testimony “do not become tainted in any way by 
compelled testimony.”79 It further noted that the burden to ensure 
taint-free evidence, identical to the burden to prove that taint does 
not exist at trial in the Kastigar hearing, is exclusively the DOJ’s 
and “the risk of error in coordination [with a foreign authority] falls 
on the U.S. Government . . . rather than on the subjects and 
targets of cross-border investigations.”80 Where two governments 
are not working perfectly in concert and where no international 
agreement exists concerning the use and derivative use of 
compelled testimony, a Kastigar hearing, therefore, seems like an 
inevitable practice for every cross-border investigation. 
II. NAVIGATING THE COMPLEXITIES OF PARALLEL 
INVESTIGATIONS IN A POST-ALLEN WORLD 
The Allen decision presents an expansion of the burden 
the DOJ faces to avoid taint in a new world of interconnected 
systems of commerce and growing power of multinational 
corporations and its employees—an “unprecedented expansion” 
 
 77 Allen, 864 F.3d 63 at 90. 
 78 Id. at 89–90; Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71. 
 79 Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71. In response to the Allen decision, law 
firms across the country released “client alerts” with a common message that “lawyers 
representing clients in cross-border criminal investigations should immediately 
challenge the domestic use of any statements that were compelled—even lawfully so—
in a foreign jurisdiction.” See, e.g., King & Spalding, Client Alert: A Constitutional Check 
on Cross-Border Enforcement Tactics: Takeaways from the Second Circuit’s Decision in 
United States v. Allen (July 25, 2017) https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/005/
137/original/ca072517.pdf?1501010675 [https://perma.cc/U3RP-VEPD]. This further 
illustrates the underlying theme that the DOJ’s failure to prosecute white-collar crime, 
as a result of this decision, is exacerbated by international prosecutions and the use of 
compelled testimony. 
 80 Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71 (alteration in original); Allen, 864 F.3d at 87–88. 
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according to the DOJ.81 Although the Second Circuit did not 
articulate how to “measure taint from foreign-obtained” 
testimony, its decision has the ability to widely impact the 
“government’s legitimate law enforcement efforts” by thwarting 
promising international white-collar prosecutions.82 In the DOJ’s 
petition for a rehearing en banc of the Allen case it opines that 
[w]hether it is a foreign trader seeking to manipulate an interest rate 
that affects millions of Americans, a foreign computer hacker seeking 
to infiltrate U.S. government or corporate networks to steal the 
personal data of our citizens, or a foreign terrorist seeking to harm our 
national security, threats that originate overseas—and are carried out 
primarily abroad—demand an aggressive response by U.S. law 
enforcement.83 
In the complex web of financial institutional structures and the 
new wave of cross-border cooperation, United States law 
enforcement and foreign authority counterparts have increasingly 
investigated the same criminal acts simultaneously, leading to 
joint enforcement actions and prosecutions.84 As of 2017, the 
Criminal Division’s Fraud Division of the DOJ “[h]a[d] over 50 
pending parallel investigations in over 40 different jurisdictions 
and involving over 50 different foreign regulatory and law 
enforcement authorities.”85 Cross-border parallel investigations 
in the financial world alone are increasing “exponentially,” 
requiring a hard look into the process of financial investigations 
on an international scale.86 
Essentially, if testimony is considered compelled under 
the Fifth Amendment, domestic prosecutors may be unable to 
“obtain[ ]  admissible evidence sufficient to support charges.”87 
This could result in, and may be another explanation for, the 
DOJ “declin[ing] to bring charges in worthy cases that the 
United States would otherwise pursue.”88 The Allen decision, 
 
 81 See Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc at 12, 
United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-898), reh’g denied, No. 16-898 
(Nov. 9, 2017), ECF No. 136. 
 82 Id. The DOJ has “already elected to forgo worthy cross-border investigations 
that, absent the [Second Circuit’s] decision, it would have vigorously pursued.” Id. at 17; 
see also infra Part III (discussing possible repercussions of the Allen decision). 
 83 Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra 
note 81, at 12. 
 84 Id. at 13. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 14. 
 88 Id. In 2015, former United States Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates 
delivered a memorandum, “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing,” which 
set forth procedures in DOJ policy for corporate investigations. Steps two through five 
are below: 
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and future decisions if other circuits follow its lead, exposes the 
apparent difficulties the United States will inevitably face in 
multijurisdictional white-collar investigations. Since the FCA 
has no restrictions on the derivative use of testimony it compels, 
unless a parallel United States investigation is initiated in the 
“very early stages” as the court plainly suggests, there is “no 
opportunity to request that the FCA ‘wall off’ or refrain from 
exposing [a witness’s] compelled testimony.”89 Similar to the 
United Kingdom, thirty-five other jurisdictions90 have 
comparable “disclosure obligations that would prohibit [their 
law enforcement agencies] from ‘walling off’ compelled evidence 
from witnesses,” which could ultimately make the DOJ’s efforts 
to bring forth an indictment with untainted evidence “futile.”91 
A. Triviality of the Allen Court’s “Solutions” 
1. It Is Nearly Impossible for DOJ’s Prosecutors to be 
First in Line for Every International Financial 
Investigation 
As the DOJ noted in its en banc petition, the Second 
Circuit’s certainty that the United States can avoid taint 
through “intimate cooperation and coordination,” specifically 
through the DOJ’s involvement in every investigation’s 
 
2. Both criminal and civil corporate investigations should focus on individuals 
from the inception of the investigation; 
3. Criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate investigations should be in 
routine communication with one another; 
4. Absent extraordinary circumstances, no corporate resolution should provide 
protection from criminal or civil liability for any individuals; 
5. Corporate cases should not be resolved without a clear plan to resolve related 
individual cases 
 
Individual Accountability, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD SECTION (FRD), 
https://www.justice.gov/dag/individual-accountability [https://perma.cc/VBK5-S6CF]. 
 89 Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra 
note 81, at 15. 
 90 The thirty-six jurisdictions that can use compelled testimony which the DOJ 
regularly coordinate with in corporate fraud investigations include the following: 
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, the European Union, France, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, 
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab 
Emirates, and the United Kingdom. 
Id. at 14. 
 91 Id. at 15. 
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beginning stages, does not consider the “practical realities of 
international [white-collar] investigations” and subsequent 
prosecutions.92 The problem of exposure to tainted testimony 
cannot be blamed on the “United States law enforcement [failure] 
to coordinate with foreign authorities adequately to avoid taint, 
for example by ‘canning’93 testimony ahead of time,” rather, it can 
be argued that it is a consequence of the lack of international 
agreements streamlining cooperation in parallel investigations.94 
In Allen, the DOJ took precautions to avoid tainted 
evidence as soon as coordination with the FCA began.95 However, 
since Robson did not become a witness for the DOJ until after 
the FCA’s compulsory interview and after he took the DOJ’s plea 
deal, “there was no opportunity for [DOJ] prosecutors to ‘can’ his 
testimony beforehand.”96 Having to forgo an indictment after an 
investigation with one of DOJ’s “most cooperative allies” because of 
lack of continuity in how compelled testimony is, or should be, 
treated reveals the “grave risk of taint [occurring] in cases in far 
less favorable circumstances.”97 While the Allen case may represent 
facts and an outcome that is case-specific,98 it exemplifies the 
overarching vulnerabilities and difficulties that the DOJ faces 
when prosecuting a foreign white-collar defendant.99 
In a recently decided case before the federal grand jury 
in the S.D.N.Y., United States v. Connolly,100 U.S. District Judge 
Colleen McMahon was left with no choice but to push a criminal 
trial back a year to allow time for a Kastigar hearing to examine 
if taint was present during the investigatory process and 
subsequent proceedings.101 Judge McMahon decided that she 
 
 92 Id. (citing United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2017)). 
 93 “Canning” testimony refers to ensuring that the testimony is not influenced 
by any outside source, notably a source that has been compelled to testify. This “canned” 
testimony can be compared to subsequent testimony to prove that later testimony is or 
is not tainted. See Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers and 
Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1330 n.76 (2001). 
 94 Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra 
note 81, at 15. 
 95 See supra Section I.B. 
 96 Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra note 
81, at 15 (emphasis in original). 
 97 Id. at 16. 
 98 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 89 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 99 See Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra 
note 81, at 17. 
 100 United States v. Connolly, 1:16-cr-00370 (CM), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36759 
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 31, 2016). 
 101 Jody Godoy, Ex-Deutsche Trader’s Libor Trial Delayed by Taint Inquiry 
(Dec. 14, 2017, 5:36 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/994990?scroll=1 
[https://perma.cc/485Q-JL3]. 
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was “not going to make the same mistake” as Judge Rakoff made 
in Allen, which she described as “fatal.”102 
In May of 2016, Matthew Connolly, a U.S. citizen, and 
Gavin Campbell Black, a U.K. citizen, were indicted with 
conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud for participating in 
the manipulation of the LIBOR interest rate while working at 
Deutsche Bank.103 Like the Allen case, however, the DOJ was not 
the first agency to retrieve the necessary information to begin 
the investigation itself,104 and, after months of investigation by 
the FCA, the DOJ decided to join its efforts and ultimately 
prosecute the individuals.105 Following the indictment, the 
defendants’ attorneys filed motions for a joint Kastigar hearing 
to determine if either defendant’s compelled testimony “infected” 
the prosecution.106 The motions argued that key cooperators 
were exposed to Black’s testimony, the DOJ received assistance 
from not only the FCA but also the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office 
and the Commodities Future Trading Commission that had 
access to the testimony, and the filter team (similar to a taint 
team) “compounded the possibility of taint by failing to redact 
its brief properly.”107 During the Kastigar hearing, the court 
invoked the heavy burden on the DOJ to prove taint-free 
testimony as established in Allen.108 After months of combing 
through evidence and analyzing the process the DOJ and FCA used 
to conduct the investigation, the court found, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the DOJ had not violated the defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment right and the indictment was upheld.109 
Judge McMahon, however, fervently distinguished the 
Deutsche case from the Rabobank case, calling it a “sharp[ ] ” 
contrast in records.110 The witness in Connolly, the “Robson,” 
 
 102 Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion for a 
Kastigar Hearing at 9–10, United States v. Connolly, 1:16-cr-00370-CM (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
25, 2017), ECF No. 142. 
 103 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Former Deutsche Bank Employees 
Indicted on Fraud Charges in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor 
(June 2, 2016) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-former-deutsche-bank-employees-
indicted-fraud-charges-connection-long-running [https://perma.cc/9SUS-NRT]; see also 
Godoy, supra note 101 
 104 See Godoy, supra note 101. 
 105 Id.; see also Decision and Order on Defendant’s Pretrial Motions, 1:16-cr-
00370-CM, (Oct. 19, 2017). 
 106 See Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion 
for a Kastigar Hearing, supra note 102 at 2–4. 
 107 Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion for a 
Kastigar Hearing, supra note 102, at 2–3. 
 108 See Order Denying the Pretrial Motion of Defendant Gavin Campbell Black 
to Dismiss the Indictment for Alleged Violations of United States v. Kastigar, United 
States v. Connolly, No. 1:16-cr-00370 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2018), ECF. No. 274. 
 109 Id. at 16–18. 
 110 Id. at 16–17. 
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never actually read either defendant’s compelled testimony, but 
instead was privy to the findings in the FCA’s Final Notice and 
was the “sole source of six specific items of information that were 
presented to the grand jury.”111 The court concluded, however, 
that the witness had a “source independent of the FCA Notice”: 
“his own personal knowledge” as a seasoned trader at Deutsche 
Bank.112 Similarly, the FCA had another source other than the 
defendant’s compelled testimony that could account for the six 
items of information given to the grand jury.113 This personal 
knowledge and the FCA’s other source that proved taint was not 
present, it can be argued, saved the DOJ’s case. If either did not 
exist, the indictments could have very well been overturned—
another Allen outcome. 
2. Taint Teams Create More Challenges Than They 
Solve 
The Second Circuit also erroneously offered the continued 
act of embedding prosecutors in foreign jurisdictions, similar to 
instituting taint teams, as a solution.114 A taint team is defined as 
“a team of officials other than the case team, who sift [through] 
documents and information received from another jurisdiction 
and only pass on to the case team those which they have the right 
to see without compromising the integrity of the proceedings.”115 
While this might be promising on its face, the task of sifting 
through and evaluating every piece of foreign-obtained evidence 
for a hint of taint is daunting.116 
The taint team procedure has a few structural flaws.117 
First, the taint team does not wall off the government from 
accessing and reviewing attorney-client privileged documents.118 
It simply “changes the identity of the government attorneys and 
 
 111 Id. at 17. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 87–90 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 115 INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, CO-OPERATION BETWEEN COMPETITION 
AGENCIES IN CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS 24 n.39 (2006), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
international/multilateral/2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VTE-PNWP]. 
 116 Id. at 24. 
 117 Stephen Jonas & Robert Keefe, Government “Taint Teams” May Open a 
Pandora’s Box: Protecting Your Electronic Records in the Event of an Investigation, 
WILMERHALE (May 11, 2004), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publications
andnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=94347 [https://perma.cc/V7XP-BCWV]; see also Robert 
J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Government Searches: The Trouble With Taint Teams, 256 
N.Y.L.J. , No. 108, Dec. 6, 2016, https://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/2016-12-
06-government-searches-the-trouble-with-taint-teams/_res/id=Attachments/index=/Albert
%20Anello%2012.6.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/96EW-2W9V]. 
 118 Jonas & Keefe, supra note 117. 
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agents who first review that information.”119 While what is 
considered attorney-client privilege in the United States is 
considered a “relatively straightforward” doctrine, “other 
jurisdictions [abroad] may apply different rules, or may not 
formally recognize privilege at all” (similar to the treatment of 
use and derivative use immunity).120 These differences “pose 
vexing questions” and would require a DOJ taint team or 
embedded filter team to navigate through every case the parallel 
agency confronts, leading to an impractical use of resources.121 A 
second inherent flaw is that “the prosecutors . . . who serve on 
taint teams cannot be expected to ignore evidence of other crimes 
they may potentially find” while reviewing, even if the 
government was not focusing initially on that issue.122 Thus, the 
trial team would have an “opportunity to assert privilege only 
over [evidence] which the taint team has identified as being 
clearly or possibly privileged [and taint-free],” which could lead 
to relevant information being overlooked because of either the 
sheer volume of evidence or unrelated matters.123 
Early access to an investigation and embedded taint teams, 
as suggested by the Second Circuit, have proven to be problematic 
solutions and are inherently flawed.124 Determining which 
testimony violates the Fifth Amendment is complex on many 
levels, especially when multinational companies are involved.125 To 
make this determination once an investigation is already 
underway requires analyzing every aspect of the testimony-
gathering process conducted abroad and domestically.126 This 
requires excess litigation and document review that expends 
 
 119 Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 840–41 & n.14 
(D.D.C. 1997). 
 120 Patrick F. Linehan & Galen Kast, Navigating Privilege Issues Across 
Multijurisdictional Investigations FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, (Apr. 2017) https://
www.financierworldwide.com/navigating-privilege-issues-across-multijurisdictional-
investigations/#.W-MzaaeZNN0 [https://perma.cc/98PK-MR69]. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Jonas & Keefe, supra note 117. 
 123 Anello & Albert, supra note 117; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (04-
124-03 and 04-124-05), 454 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]aint teams present inevitable, 
and reasonably foreseeable, risks to privilege, for they have been implicated in the past 
in leaks of confidential information to prosecutors. That is to say, the government taint 
team may have an interest in preserving privilege, but it also possesses a conflicting 
interest in pursuing the investigation, and, human nature being what it is, occasionally 
some taint-team attorneys will make mistakes or violate their ethical obligations. It is 
thus logical to suppose that taint teams pose a serious risk to holders of privilege, and 
this supposition is substantiated by past experience.”). 
 124 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 87-90 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 125 See supra Part I (analyzing direct use and derivative use immunity and its 
implications on foreign-born evidence). 
 126 See supra Section I.A (articulating the Kastigar standard). 
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valuable resources.127 The court in Allen urged the DOJ to take 
more initiative to combat this by entering the investigation stage 
earlier.128 Without a standard of what constitutes “earlier,” the 
Second Circuit has created a gray area for the DOJ to interpret 
going forward.129 A solution in the forefront is therefore necessary 
to avoid the constitutional question of tainted testimony and its 
Fifth Amendment implications altogether in LIBOR-specific and 
other international white-collar crimes. Not only does the Allen 
decision affect market manipulation cases, it also has 
ramifications for statutes that have been crucial in other 
international investigations.130 
B. Beyond LIBOR-Specific Cases—Possible Impact of the 
Allen Decision on Future Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Cases 
In an effort to curb general fraudulent corporation 
actions, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was enacted 
in 1977 to “prohibit[ ]  . . . bribes to foreign officials to assist in 
obtaining . . . business.”131 The DOJ has applied the FCPA to 
prohibited conduct across the world in which publicly traded 
companies (in other words, global financial companies) and their 
officers, directors, and employees are held accountable.132 In 
2016, the United States saw exponential “increases in 
international cooperation in anti-corruption enforcement” of the 
FCPA.133 The DOJ saw “success[ ]  in the fight against global 
corruption by coordinating with and leveraging the resources of 
their foreign counterparts,”134 through a “landmark global 
resolution[ ] ” reached with Odebrecht S.A., the largest Brazilian 
construction company in Latin America, “and the continuing 
investigation and prosecution of individuals involved in the 
 
 127 Id. (discussing the Kastigar hearing). 
 128 Allen, 864 F.3d at 87. 
 129 See Hartley M.K. West et al., Cross-Border Criminal Investigations Just 
Became More Complicated, RECORDER (Sept. 7, 2017). 
 130 John Cornell Fuller, Second Circuit Limits FCPA Enforcement Tools, FOX 
ROTHSCHILD LLP (Aug. 25, 2017), https://internationaltrade.foxrothschild.com/2017/
08/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-fcpa/second-circuit-limits-fcpa-enforcement-tools/ 
[https://perma.cc/C4U4-NYGZ]. 
 131 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/foreign-corrupt-practices-act.shtml [https://perma.cc/3XF6-899L]. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Client Memorandum, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, FCPA 
Enforcement and Anti-Corruption Developments: 2016 Year in Review 13 (Jan. 20, 
2017), https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/anti-corruption-fcpa/publications/
fcpa-enforcement-and-anti-corruption-developments-2016-year-in-review?id=23567 
[https://perma.cc/86TE-LHE3]. 
 134 Id. 
318 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1 
international soccer corruption scandal.”135 Both cases prove the 
DOJ’s concern with working with parallel agencies and 
encouraging “foreign governments [to] tak[e] more aggressive 
stances through legislation and enforcement to attack the 
problem of international corruption.”136 
In 2016, Odebrecht pleaded guilty to FCPA charges and 
agreed to pay billions to United States, Brazilian, and Swiss 
authorities.137 The DOJ noted that the Odebrecht resolution is 
notable because it “implicat[ed] officials at the highest levels of 
government . . . and major Brazilian companies and their 
executives” which can be contributed to the invaluable aid of 
Brazilian authorities.138 DOJ officials, in response, issued public 
statements highlighting that foreign coordination, “once a rare 
event in FCPA investigations and resolutions,” is becoming 
increasingly prominent and vital.139 Further, the DOJ stated 
that “an international approach is being taken to combat an 
international criminal problem . . . [and] we are sharing leads 
with our international law enforcement counterparts, and they 
are sharing them with us.”140 
Since Brazil is one of the thirty-six141 countries that 
legally allows compelled testimony and its derivative use, would 
the Odebrecht case have had a different result if the DOJ was 
not the agency to first initiate the investigation? If the DOJ had 
joined the Brazilian agency later in the investigation, perhaps 
the DOJ would have had to deny prosecution due to issues of 
tainted testimony. And, if, because of taint, the DOJ could not 
have been involved in the case, the question of whether Brazil 
 
 135 Id. at 13, 15. On the International Soccer Corruption Scandal: 
Since May 2015, U.S. authorities have charged over [forty-two] individuals and 
entities with racketeering, wire fraud, money laundering and other offenses in 
connection with a decades-long scheme to enrich themselves by awarding 
lucrative marketing contracts in exchange for bribes. To date, [twenty-two] 
defendants have pleaded guilty. In 2016, seven individuals pleaded guilty to 
criminal charges in the case, including the former president of Honduras and 
former officials of regional and national soccer federations.  
Id. at 17–18. 
 136 Id. at 13. 
 137 Id. at 15. 
 138 Id. at 15–16. 
 139 Id. at 13. 
 140 United States Department of Justice Memorandum on The Fraud Section’s 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/file/838386/download [https://perma.cc/
VT49-TWP4]. 
 141 See supra note 90. 
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would have had the resources to prosecute these white-collar 
crimes without United States’ aid is compelling.142 
III. SOLUTION: CHILLING EFFECT OF SECOND CIRCUIT’S 
DECISION CAN BE PREVENTED BY IMPLEMENTING 
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES SPECIFICALLY 
GEARED TOWARD CROSS-BORDER WHITE-COLLAR 
INVESTIGATIONS 
The “international approach . . . to combat an 
international criminal problem” is the key language in which 
prosecuting international white-collar crimes must be handled.143 
The overwhelming burden on the DOJ to prove taint-free evidence 
to avoid constitutional questions and Kastigar hearings is nearly 
impossible in the new age of a global economy. The law itself must 
evolve with the times, and international cooperation is at the 
forefront of the twenty-first century. Multinational companies 
and their employees drive the global economy, and investigations 
to prosecute white-collar crimes are vital to maintain and protect 
a healthy financial system. It is essential that the United States 
is part of this movement and a specific international agreement 
can provide a platform which will allow prosecutions by the DOJ 
to be carried out effectively. 
A. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) 
In the realm of international law, Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties (MLATs) allow law enforcement officials, including the 
DOJ, to make international requests for assistance by foreign 
parallel counterparts relating to evidence gathering activities.144 
Since they are legally binding negotiated agreements,145 United 
States district courts are instructed to review incoming requests 
and may deny them if they do not comport with domestic law, 
 
 142 If the DOJ cannot avoid taint by being first in line for every financial 
investigation, white-collar crimes committed by individuals may unfortunately avoid 
prosecution, “unless pursued by foreign law enforcement authorities.” Unfortunately, 
“foreign authorities may not have the ability or resources—or the desire—to pursue 
enforcement proceedings that vindicate the interests of the United States.” See Petition 
of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra note 81, at 16–17. 
 143 United States Department of Justice Memorandum on The Fraud Section’s 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/file/838386/download [https://perma.cc/
VT49-TWP4]. 
 144 T. Markus Funk, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters Rogatory: A 
Guide for Judges, FED. JUD. CTR. INT’L LITIG. GUIDE 6 (2014), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/MLAT-LR-Guide-Funk-FJC-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KZK2-5D2T]. 
 145 Id. at 5. 
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including the protections granted under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments of the Constitution.146 
In the United States, an MLAT is negotiated by the DOJ 
with approval of the U.S. State Department.147 The Secretary of 
State then “formally submits the proposed MLAT . . . to the 
President of the United States for transmittal to the U.S. 
Senate.”148 After Senate approval, “the President signs the treaty” 
to be enforced.149 When participating countries have complied 
with entry-into-force provisions, the “MLAT becomes binding 
under international law.”150 
When a foreign country’s agency, for example the FCA, 
requests United States’ assistance pursuant to an MLAT, the 
United States court must determine whether “(1) the terms of 
the MLAT prescribe practices or procedures for the taking of 
testimony and production of evidence, (2) the Federal Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence apply, or (3) the MLAT requires some 
sort of a hybrid approach.”151 MLATs allow the United States to 
follow the outlined procedures of the requesting country, including 
the rules related to privilege and testimony gathering.152 
B. MLAT with the U.K. 
The United States already has a general MLAT in place 
with the United Kingdom (as well as bilateral MLATs with every 
member of the European Union and many other countries world-
wide)153 regarding taking testimony and producing evidence in 
the jurisdiction of the requested party.154 In the relevant portion 
of the “Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters” it states: 
1. A person in the territory of the Requested Party from whom 
evidence is requested pursuant to this Treaty may be compelled, if 
necessary, to appear in order to testify or produce documents, records, 
or articles of evidence by subpoena or such other method as may be 
permitted under the law of the Requested Party. 
 
 146 Id. at 6–7. 
 147 Id. at 6. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 6, 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 
96-1202. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176269.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y5SD-DPJY]. 
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2. A person requested to testify or to produce documentary 
information or articles in the territory of the Requested Party may be 
compelled to do so in accordance with the requirements of the law of 
the Requested Party. If such a person asserts a claim of immunity, 
incapacity or privilege under the laws of the Requesting Party, the 
evidence shall nonetheless be taken and the claim be made known to 
the Requesting Party for resolution by the authorities of that Party.155 
This MLAT agreement gives the United Kingdom (namely, the 
FCA) the ability to use compelled testimony, in accordance with 
their laws.156 This does not, however, guard the United States 
from obtaining testimony that is in direct violation of the 
Constitution, leaving a gaping hole in foreign testimony-
gathering procedure in accordance with U.S. law.157 
C. MLAT and Taint Team Hybrid 
The United States along with its foreign counterparts 
should ratify a new MLAT that instills the principles that a taint 
team provides, as a way to close the gap and ensure that the DOJ 
can fully invest its resources into prosecuting white-collar crimes. 
Given the increase in financial fraud cases in the last decade, a new 
MLAT to address current issues of cross-border investigations is 
paramount. An amended MLAT, directed at all thirty-six 
jurisdictions where use and derivative use of compelled testimony 
is lawful, would circumvent the unfairness concerns of a taint 
team, obviate the need to address Fifth Amendment concerns, and 
also provide the United States with the necessary leverage to 
combat these financial crimes.158 
In the past, there have been case-specific bilateral 
treaties between the United States and other governments on 
high-level criminal fraud cases.159 Between 1976 and 1982, the 
DOJ created executive agreements with “[twenty-eight] 
countries for the purpose of facilitating the sharing and transfer 
of investigative information and evidence between law 
enforcement agencies of the respective countries in specific 
investigations and prosecutions.”160 These, now considered 
“Lockheed Agreements,” were agreed upon based on the 
“seriousness and sensitivity of the investigations” and “the 
 
 155 Id. at 9–10. 
 156 Id. at 10. 
 157 See id. 
 158 See generally Jonas & Keefe, supra note 117. 
 159 MICHAEL ABBELL, OBTAINING EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3-4, 
99 (2010). “The majority of these investigations [concerned] alleged bribes paid to high-
ranking foreign officials by [large] U.S. aircraft manufacturers.” Id. 
 160 Id. 
322 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1 
affected governmental authorities agree[ment] that the 
investigations had to proceed quickly.”161 “Given the exigencies 
of the circumstances, [ ]  the number of affected countries,” and 
expected time it takes for a general MLAT to be ratified, the 
United States and the twenty-eight affected countries 
“negotiate[d] a series of similarly worded, case specific, 
executive agreements.”162 
One can argue that the 2008 financial crisis amounted to 
a grave situation in which a Lockheed-like MLAT would have 
been appropriate. Now, nearly ten years after the global 
economy suffered a major hit, an expedited agreement between 
affected countries is no longer necessary. Instead, the United 
States and countries that currently use compelled testimony in 
their criminal investigations in the aftermath of the crisis, 
should negotiate an agreement specifically geared towards 
evidence collection in white-collar financial crimes. 
For example, the United States and the United Kingdom 
should implement an MLAT for “Testimony Gathering in 
Criminal Cases Involving Financial Corporations and 
Individual White-Collar Crimes within the United States and 
the United Kingdom.” The MLAT would address that before an 
investigation begins in either country, the government 
authorities (DOJ and the FCA) would establish which authority 
would be prosecuting. If the DOJ takes the lead on a case, the 
FCA cannot compel testimony related to that case. If the FCA is 
the primary authority assigned, it must notify the DOJ when 
compelled testimony will be taken or used, and both parties will 
agree upon its necessity. The “necessity” standard would be 
based on the likelihood in which the testimony will be used to 
implicate other individuals within the corporation. 
This new specific MLAT form would essentially avoid the 
risk of taint from the beginning of the investigatory process 
without sending prosecutors to work full-time with foreign 
agencies163 on financial white-collar crime matters and 
ultimately avoid litigating a Kastigar hearing. Further, the 
burden of taint-free evidence would not fall entirely on the 
 
 161 Id. at 100. 
 162 Id. at 100–01 (“The first of these executive agreements, the [A]greement 
with Japan on Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Administration of Justice in 
Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Matter, was concluded and entered into force 
within weeks of the initial public disclosure that payments may have been made by 
Lockheed to high-ranking Japanese government officials to induce the government’s 
purchase of Lockheed aircraft. Within the following nine months, the United States 
concluded similar agreements with nine other countries.”). 
 163 See Latham & Watkins, supra note 75. 
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DOJ,164 since the issue would be addressed upfront and both 
agencies involved would be required to fully cooperate and 
comply with the agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
As we enter a “new era of crime on a global scale,” law 
enforcement agencies are navigating the complexities of the ever-
growing “criminal enterprises and global corporate misconduct.”165 
Arguably, the international nature of crime is driven by “global 
expansion of the footprint and market participation of U.S. and 
foreign companies, and the growing interdependency of [the U.S.] 
economy and those of nations around the world.”166 As a result, the 
DOJ has expanded its criminal investigations abroad while foreign 
enforcement agencies have continued conducting their own 
criminal cases. Often, however, the agencies are investigating the 
same misconduct, which has fostered cooperation in these 
investigations and subsequent prosecutorial proceedings. This 
cross-border coordination has created a new and valuable 
dimension in prosecuting white-collar crimes. 
Despite the advances in pursuing crimes in a transnational 
setting, cases like Allen have exposed fundamental differences 
between the legal authority governing testimony gathering and the 
evidence that is allowed in the American courtroom. These 
differences, if not addressed, have grave consequences. Instead of 
expending resources to determine whether tainted evidence exists 
or reducing the cases that the DOJ hears altogether, an 
international legal remedy to circumvent constitutional concerns is 
necessary—an international solution to further the efforts of the 
DOJ and its foreign counterparts. 
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